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Abstract: Countries with deposit insurances differ significantly on how much 
protection their insurance provides. We study the optimal coverage limit in a 
model of deposit insurance with capital requirements and risk sensitive 
premia to prevent moral hazard. Depositors have incentives to monitor the 
bank’s risk taking behavior, thus threatening banks with withdrawals of 
deposits if necessary. We find that either banking regulations or market 
discipline is insufficient to reduce bank’s risk. In addition, our numerical 
example explains the differences in coverage cross countries which agree 
with empirical evidence. We show that low income countries provide more 
generous insurance protection than higher income countries.  
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1. Introduction 
Countries differ significantly on the amount of protection their deposit 
insurance provides. Most developed countries have a smaller ratio of coverage limit 
per capita GDP than developing countries (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002). 
Coverage limits also vary over time. In the United States, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act of 2005 has increased the coverage limit for retirement accounts to 
$250,000. 2  The legislation authorizing temporary increases in deposit insurance 
coverage of all accounts to $250,000 through December 31, 2013 was in response to 
the unforeseen financial crises started in late 2007.  
The purpose of this paper is to study the optimal level of coverage and shed 
light on the liquidity of deposit insurance. The theoretical model has incorporated 
capital requirements, risk-sensitive premium, and partial deposit insurance in a partial 
equilibrium model. The model discusses the interaction among risk-taking banks, 
ex-ante heterogeneous depositors, and a deposit insurer. 
In the current crisis, banking regulations combined with the poor management 
and supervision, in part, have been responsible for the bank’s improper leverages, 
lending and securitization. A bank failure could easily turn into a crisis when the 
financial institution is overly exposed to credit risks and when the government is least 
equipped to deal with those risks. While regulatory arbitrage and incomplete risk 
transfers increase the risk in the banking system, pricing of deposit insurance that 
subsidizes bank's improper investment decisions may also exacerbate risk taking.3 In 
this paper, we study the effect of the well-designed deposit insurance to manage 
bank’s moral hazard induced by unsophisticated regulations prior to a crisis.  
Our paper is related to three strands of research, including work on market 
discipline against bank’s risk taking behavior, work on prudent banking regulations 
against moral hazard, and work on determining the level of insurance coverage. We 
attempt to bring together these three strands by focusing on the role of optimal 
coverage limit in combating moral hazard and, further, reduce the chance of a banking 
failure. 
The literature on market discipline focuses on how deposit insurance reduces 
depositors’ incentives to monitor. Market discipline from depositors takes place by 
either demanding higher interest rates or by withdrawing deposits early. The goals of 
deposit insurance are to protect unsophisticated depositors, to smooth bank liquidity 
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3 25 financial institutions in 2008, 140 in 2009, and 15 up to date in 2010 have been assumed or 
purchased through the FDIC. “without substantial amounts of additional assessment revenue in the near 
future, current projections indicate that the fund balance will approach zero or even become negative” 
(Bair, 2009). The FDIC proposed an emergency premium that plans to charge a higher regular 
premium. However, these actions will worsen the procyclical of lending. Pennacchi (2005), Jarrow, 
Madan and Unal (2006) are examples. 
 
  
services, and to prevent banking panics. However, over-expanded deposit insurance, 
which shifts the risk of potential banking failure mostly to taxpayers, will weaken 
market discipline and exacerbate moral hazard. Greenspan (2002) provided an 
annotation for the problem in the banking system: 
The market discipline to control risks that insured depositors would 
otherwise have imposed on banks and thrifts has been weakened. 
Relieved of that discipline, banks and thrifts naturally feel less 
inhibited from taking on more risk than they would otherwise 
assume.4 
Empirical evidence supports Greenspan’s statement. Using a panel of 61 
countries, Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) show countries with generous 
coverage limits have higher probabilities of banking crises. Demirguc-Kunt and Kane 
(2002) show that interest rates increase significantly with bank riskiness for those 
partially insured instruments. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) provide 
cross-country evidence about how deposit insurance makes depositors less sensitive to 
bank risks. Similarly, Martin (2006) shows a blanket deposit insurance guarantee 
financed by taxing depositors either induces moral hazard or cannot prevent bank 
panics. To summarize, the literature shows complete deposit insurance weakens 
market discipline and increases the chance of banking failures. Depositors and banks 
who are protected from the negative consequence of risk taking will not hesitate to 
engage in risky banking practices. Our emphasis on the effect of market discipline is 
to focus on whether the action of depositors who are credible excluded from insurance 
can successfully reduce bank’s risk. 
The loss of market discipline could be compensated by banking regulation and 
supervision (Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002). The literature on prudent banking 
regulations emphasizes the role of capital requirement. Hellmann, Murdock, Stiglitz 
(2000) show capital requirement can reduce bank’s risk, but the result is Pareto 
inefficient. Banks will hold no capital under a full deposit insurance scheme with 
moral hazard. Cooper and Ross (2002) conclude that bank runs can be eliminated 
without depositors’ monitoring if the capital requirement is sufficiently large. In this 
paper, we show that with capital requirement, depositor’s monitoring is crucial to 
prevent banking failures. Informational friction between depositors, the government, 
and the bank gives depositors the incentives to monitor. 
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The literature on banking regulation also discusses how to use the 
risk-sensitive premium against moral hazard. Asymmetric information and 
regulation-induced conflict of interest make pricing deposit insurance difficult. Chan, 
Greenbaum, and Thakor (1992) conclude that fairly priced deposit insurance is not 
 
4 The Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan, Paragraph 7. 
 
  
incentive compatible and will not solve the moral hazard in a one-period model. 
Under socially optimal deposit insurance, Giammarino, Lewis, and Sappington (1993) 
show that high quality banks face lower capital requirement. Bhattacharya, Boot, and 
Thakor (1998) survey the literature and summarize that cash-asset reserve 
requirements, risk-based capital requirement, risk-sensitive deposit insurance 
premium, and partial deposit insurance may all be effective in dealing with the moral 
hazard problem. Boyd, Chang, and Smith (2002) study how deposit insurance is 
priced and how government makes up the possible FDIC shortfalls. We use related 
ideas to understand the effectiveness of a risk-based premium. We find, however, 
most of the literature either assumes deposits are fully insured or excludes the chance 
of default of the insurer. In this study, we explain why a wide range of variation of 
coverage from unlimited guarantee to tight coverage limits could exist.5  In an 
environment with capital requirements, bank’s investment incentives, depositors’ 
market discipline, and a chance of default of the insurer, we contribute to the existing 
literature by releasing the assumption of full insurance and providing a way to jointly 
determine the optimal risk-sensitive premium and the level of coverage.  
Finally, our paper is related to a theoretical study of the optimal level of 
coverage of deposit insurance. Under the framework of global game, Manz (2009) 
finds that a higher level of insurance mitigates market failure but increases the chance 
of inefficiency. While the contribution of Manz’s paper is to study the comparative 
statics of the optimal level of coverage, we make an effort to explain why countries 
have different coverage among the deposit insurance provided by using a simple 
model with heterogonous depositor, banks, and an insurer.  
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Some important conclusions are noteworthy. First, we show that optimal 
coverage encourages depositors’ monitoring and withdrawals. Social welfare 
improvement can be reached through the implementation of partial deposit insurance 
when the gain from banks outweighs the losses from depositors. Second, 
risk-sensitive premium and market discipline are essential to reduce bank risk taking 
behavior. Third, the adjustment between the level of coverage and the premium 
guarantees long term liquidity of the deposit insurance funds and makes banks better 
off. Fourth, the numerical findings are consistent with the empirical evidence that 
shows differences in coverage between countries. Our numerical example indicates 
that low income countries are willing to provide greater insurance protection than 
higher income countries. 
 
5 Demirguc and Kane (2002) and Demirguc, Kane, and Laeven (2008) summarize that some poor 
countries provide generous coverage than the high-income countries and developed countries or 
relatively high-income countries tend to provide less protection For example, Central African Republic, 
Chad, and Peru set up the coverage limits that are far above the deposits saved by their citizens. Austria, 
Belgium, Germany, and the United Kingdom have a coverage limit which is equal to or even less than 
the GDP per capita. 
 
  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 is the theoretical model. Section 3 is 
a numerical example and followed by the conclusion in section 4. 
 
2. The Model  
 
Depositor’s Monitoring 
There is a continuum of ex-ante heterogeneous depositors with unit mass in 
the economy. With a fraction q, a depositor was born with higher endowments, D1, 
and belongs to the group of the rich; otherwise, she has fewer endowments, D2, and 
belongs to the poor group. D1> D2 and we assume q < 1-q. The questions depositors 
confront are whether they will monitor the bank and whether they will withdraw early 
from the bank. At the beginning of each period, the FDIC announces the maximum 
coverage limit,C , to the public. Depositors save at the bank and the bank chooses 
investment portfolios. Then, depositors decide whether to monitor the bank with the 
cost, d, to become informed.6 Informed depositors who know the return on assets and 
the true failing probability, Pf, of the bank can withdraw early before the bank 
exhausts its resources in a simple one-shot game. Early withdrawal, however, is not 
free; the cost of early withdrawal is the interest depositors would have earned from 
saving. A simple assumption, 2 2 1D rD C D d rD< < < − < 1
                                                
, reveals different actions 
taken by heterogeneous depositors.7 r is the given deposit interest rate in a partial 
equilibrium setup, where r>1. Under the maximum coverage limit, rich depositors are 
partially uninsured even after paying monitoring cost. On the other hand, poor 
depositors will receive the full guarantee from insurance if the bank fails. 
 
Figure 1 Depositors’ Two-Step Decision 
 
6 Bank’s historical financial statements are available for the public free of charge but the up-to-date 
information such as banking management, financial ratio and detailed off-balance-sheet activity can 
only be obtained from some financial company who gather those data thoughtfully for sale.      
5 
7 The model does not discuss the possibility of a contagious run and the free rider problem. Each 
depositor’s withdrawal is unobservable to the rest of depositors. Thus, no one can take advantage from 
the action taken by others. Of course, other equilibria result from the liquidity shock, informational 
shock, and sunspot could happen when releasing the constraint on interdependence among agencies. 
Then, the free rider problem and panic bank run equilibrium may occur.  
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Figure 1 shows the depositor’s decision of monitoring and withdrawal. If 
monitoring cost is moderate, informed depositors will then decide whether to 
withdraw depending on the chance of banking failure. Depositor’s expected return if 
monitoring is Pf (D1-d)+(1-Pf)r(D1-d). Otherwise, the expected return for uninformed 
depositor without an effort of monitoring is * * 1(1 )f fP C P rD+ − . In such case, 
uninformed depositors observe only *fP  that indicates an estimate of the bank’s 
failing probability from the past experience. *fP  may or may not truly reflect the 
chance of default of a bank. Uninformed depositors will receive up to the FDIC’s 
maximum coverage and will lose the uninsured deposits when bank fails. From the 
discussion above, we know that if the initial endowment of the rich depositors is 
greater than D*, where 
D* ≡ 
*
*
(1 )
(1 )
f f f
f f
P C P d P rd
r P rP
+ + −
− + , 
monitoring the bank is incentive compatible; otherwise, depositors rather remain 
uninformed because monitoring is too expensive. The expected return of depositors is 
 
ERD = q{Pr(D1>D*)[ fP (D1-d)+(1- fP )r(D1-d)] 
 +Pr(D1<D*)[ *fP C +(1-
*
fP )rD1]}+(1-q)rD2 (1). 
The first term in equation (1) indicates the return for rich depositors, which includes 
the expected return with and without monitoring, and the second term is the return for 
the poor depositors.8  
                                                 
8 Government deposit insurance guarantee could be unclear. The maximum coverage could be easily 
avoided and certain accounts could indirectly get full insurance (Pennacchi, 2006). The examples are 
allocating large deposits cross member banks within the same multi-bank holding company and 
shifting sweep account balances from money market mutual fund to the insured account. In this study, 
market discipline is enforced through incentives from exclusive creditors. The substitute subordinated 
debt holders could result in a stronger incentive to monitor. 
Rich 
q
Depositor
Poor 
1-q
r.D1
fP  *fP  
D1-d r(D1-d) C  
Not
Not FailNot
Monitor 
Withdrawal Fail 
Save All 
 
  
One special case this study considers is the situation when government 
provides no deposit insurance. In the absence of a deposit insurer, the model simply 
goes back to the economy in which the bank provides deposit contracts that transform 
funds to those who have a profitable investment opportunity from those who have 
extra funds. Without the FDIC, depositor’s self-protection seems necessary; even the 
poor depositors who were born with fewer endowments have incentives to monitor.  
 
Banks’ Gambling Behavior  
Other than depositors, there is a continuum of identical banks with unit mass 
in the economy. At the beginning of each period, the FDIC announces the maximum 
level of coverage and collects the insurance risk premium, p, from banks. Banks are 
the only ones that have access to investment technology. A representative risk-neutral 
bank maximizes its expected return by choosing the combination between a risk-free 
asset with a certain return α, and a risky asset, I, with a random realized return, R. We 
assume the return of risky assets belongs to N( R ,σ2), where 1< α < R . Only the bank 
and informed depositors know the private information about the portfolio of risky 
assets and the realized returns afterwards. Moral hazard problem arises from bank’s 
unobservable temptation to gamble. To reduce the inappropriate risk-sharing from 
banks to taxpayers, banks face a capital requirement constraint. An exogenous 
fraction k is the required capital per unit of deposit, and kD is shareholders’ equity 
capital that has to match the minimum capital requirement. Capital requirements that 
force shareholders to put their own money at risk provide the motivation for the bank 
to take prudent action. But capital is costly. It comes with a cost, ρ, which is higher 
than the return of risk-free assets.9 ρ>α. The expected return of a profit-maximizing 
bank is 
7 
 ER  =B [ ]{ }(1 ) ( ) ( )R I k p ED I k r ED
R
f R dR EWα ρ
∞
⋅ + + − − − + −∫    (2). 

The first term in equation (2) is the net expected return on assets. ED is the expected 
deposits resulting from depositor’s monitoring decision. The second term in equation 
(2), EW, is the potential early withdrawals from informed depositors if monitoring. 
The lower bound of the integral, R , represents bank’s break-even point. When R> R , 
the bank will keep operating because its return on assets is enough to pay off all 
obligations for creditors and depositors. Otherwise, the bank fails.10 The elements 
                                                 
9 Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (2002) have the similar assumption. 
10 A bank’s true failing probability can be seen as the portion of insolvent banks assumed by the FDIC 
if there is more than one bank in the society. 
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inside t
thus, there is no need to withdraw early. From equation (2), we know the 
ank’s break-even condition  (ρk+r)ED. From th
we define  
(3). 
he integral are the return from risky assets, RI, followed by the return of safety 
assets, α[(1+k-p)ED-I], and the cost to repay shareholders and depositors, (ρk+r)ED.  
The informed depositors know ex ante the realization of bank’s risky assets 
before a banking failure. If return on assets is large enough, the bank earns positive 
profits, and 
b holds when RI+α[(1+k-p)ED-I] = ere, 
 R ≡ α-(1/I)[α(1+k-p)-(ρk+r)]ED  
 
When prob(R> R ), depositors will not panic and withdrawal irrationally. 
Meanwhile, the bank faces a credible threat from informed depositors to 
withdraw if the portfolio tends to be too risky. To guarantee that the informed 
depositors can successfully withdraw uninsured deposits before the bank runs out of 
resources, the condition, q (D1-d- C ) R.I+ α[(1+k-p)ED–I], needs to hold. The 
amount of withdrawals on the left hand side must be less than the bank’s gross return 
on investment on the right hand side. Rˆ  is the lower bound of the random realized 
return that satisfies the feasibility constraint above. Before repaying th  uninform
 ≤
e ed 
depositors and shareholders, gross payoffs of the bank must be sufficient for the 
informe  depositor to withd  g r tha , where 
 
n Rˆd raw. It implies that R should be reate
 Rˆ ≡ α-(1/I)[α(1+k-p)ED-q.(D1-d-C )]  (4). 
 
Equation (5) is the expected withdrawal from depositors. Rich depositors who 
monitor the bank will withdraw the uninsured deposits when knowing the bank is 
going to fail at the probability R< R . Also, early withdrawal is feasible for depositors 
when R> . Combined with equation (3) and (4), we define the lower bound, , and 
ulate potential withdrawals from 
Rˆ Rˆ
the upper bound, R , to calc depositors. the 
 EW = ( )1 1
ˆ
Pr * .( ) ( )
R
q D D D d C f dR> − −∫  (5). 
Withdrawing the unprotected portion of deposits, D1-d-
R
R

C , is the consequence of 
monitoring.11 However, the adverse effect of the withdrawal could drive down a 
ank’s franchise value. Lower franchise value implies unfavorable quality of 
se the risk taking behavior of the bank.  
                                                
b
collaterals which may increa
 
The FDIC’s Optimization 
 
11 At the time of an economic downturn or a panic, however, depositor would withdraw irrationally 
from the bank. In that case, the informed depositor who monitors the bank will withdraw totally, D1-d, 
before the banking failure occurs. 
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ubjects to its budget constraint. The 
bjective function of the FDIC is the sum of the expected return from depositors and 
 
 
utflow of the insurance funds are highly tied to the 
amount of coverage, depositors’ withdrawal decisions, and the risks of bank. The 
DIC’s budget constraint is 
The third player in the economy is the deposit insurer. The FDIC indemnifies 
depositors when banks are unable to meet their obligations and file for bankruptcy. 
The FDIC maximizes social welfare and s
o
the bank as we specify in equation (1) and (2) 
SW = ERD+ERB (6). 
 
When the bank’s actions are not observable, the FDIC must design a 
compensation scheme to give banks incentives to take on the socially desirable 
actions. If the bank’s portfolio is relatively risky, the greater the chance the bank may 
default and that places a heavier burden on the deposit insurance funds. Hence, the 
FDIC will charge a higher insurance premium for this financial intermediary. When 
the bank fails, the FDIC reimburses the depositors of the troubled bank up to the 
maximum coverage limit. O
F
 { }2. . (1 ) ( )Rp ED q C q rD f R dR
−∞
≥ + −∫  (7). 
The left hand side of the equation (7) is the Deposit Insurance Funds financed by 
collecting risk premium. The use of funds depends on the action of a bank and 
depositors, which is on the right hand side of the equation. When a ban

k files for 
bankruptcy, R< , the FDIC repays rich depositors in the failing bank up to the 
mburses principal and interests to the poor.12  
R
maximum coverage and rei
 
3. A Numerical Example 
We solve the model numerically by considering the interdependence between players. 
The first loop control variable is the bank’s failing probability, Pf, from 1·10-3 to 
5·10-3 in a 1·10-5 interval. At each Pf , the second loop counter variable C is 
initialized at $80,000 at the start of the first pass through the loop, and automatically 
increments by $1,000 each time through the loop to $250,000. From the loops, we can 
jointly determine the optimization for both depositors and the bank. The process 
behind the model is that given a coverage limit, the greater the chance of withdrawal 
the lower the risky asset a bank is going to choose. The fewer risky assets a bank 
                                                 
12 Without aggregate uncertainty, other aspects such as the solvency of the FDIC can be managed in a 
form of a tax or a subsidy from/to banks and depositors. In a general equilibrium model, Boyd et 
al.(2002) model deposit insurance finances through taxing depositors. 
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nd the chance of withdrawals. 
optimal coverage results from the highest total return. Hence, the combination of EW, 
engages, the lower the possibility it will be insolvent if risky assets do not payoff and, 
hence, lower depositor’s willingness to monitor a The 
I and C in terms of a set of exogenous variables, 2 *1 2( , , , ,D D q d R, , , , , , )fP k rσ α ρ , as 
 model.13 The details are in Appendix 1. 
lic is the first sign 
f a crisis trigger. We should note that a low coverage may jump start depositor’s 
use a panic or a contagious bank run.  
 1 Equ  Result 
ce 
the optimization in the
 
Equilibrium Result 
Table 1 shows the equilibrium results. One can see that the cost of promoting the 
partially covered insurance is high. It requires the FDIC to establish a fairly low 
coverage to encourage depositor’s monitoring. The partial coverage could be 
beneficial in preventing a financial crisis which results from moral hazard and credit 
risks. Partial coverage could also be a good device to avoid unlimited implicit 
guarantee when a crisis unfolds. However, the confidence of the pub
o
irrational withdrawals and ca
 
Table ilibrium
Insuran SW C  p ERD EW ERB Pf I 
Full 8 44061 ----- 0.001 40488 ----- 3573.3 0.0017 7188.3
Partial 44058 $80,000 0.0017 40482 8.2258 3576.6 0.0018 7255 
No 44041 ----- ----- 40433 120.3225 3607.5 0.0030 7993.4
Note: Table 1 illustrates the equilibrium result from a numerical example in corresponding 
system. SW is social welfare including the expected return from depositors and bank; C is the 
ptimal coverage; p is the risk premium; ERD is the expected return to depositors; EW is 
expecte
                                                
o
d withdrawals; ERB is the expected return to banks; Pf shows the failing probability, 
and I is risky assets. 
 
Comparing the equilibrium results in a partial insurance to the ones under full 
insurance, we note that depositors are better off under full insurance, but banks are 
better off under partial insurance. When the gains of depositors outweigh the losses of 
banks, full insurance has the highest social welfare. The results also reflect certain 
adverse effects of monitoring. The threat of depositors’ monitoring and intention to 
withdraw can reduce bank’s risk ex ante. But depositor’s ex post withdrawals reduce 
the franchise value of a bank and, thus, stimulate bank’s incentives to gamble. The net 
 
*
13 The parameter values in a benchmark are as follows: D1 = $125,000, D2 = $30,000, q = 0.1, d = 50, 
fP = 0.01, R = 1.2, σ = 0.17, α = 1.1, ρ = 1.12, r = 1.025, and k = 0.04. Since small depositors 
represent a relatively large portion of total savers, we assume 90 percent of the depositors are fully 
covered by insurance. For a bank to be within the range of adequately capitalized, the required capital 
ratio is around 4% to 8%. 
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ral, the higher the chance a bank is going to gamble. Hence, 
risky a
 greatest risk of default at 0.3 percent. 
Losses 
 
involve
ability moves to the other end of the scale, the economy without 
insurance has the highest welfare. But high expected returns come with the highest 
chance of default. 
 
 
Figure 2 Equilibrium Results 
                                                
worth of a bank is the collateral from shareholders that would be lost if the bank fails. 
The lower the collate
ssets the bank holds, 7255, under partial insurance are slightly higher than 
under full insurance. 
This numerical example illustrates another important point: without banking 
regulations, deposit insurance, and government intervention, market discipline is 
insufficient to manage bank risk taking behavior. Depositors who frequently monitor 
and supervise have the lowest welfare at 40,433, among all insurance schemes. 
Without deposit insurer, banks engaging in risky activities create higher expected 
return. But potential profit accompanies with
from depositors outweigh the gain from banks; therefore, the system with only 
market discipline has lowest social welfare.  
It is worth pointing out that this model provides an alternate way to derive the 
optimal risk premium. We suggest the risk premium around 17 to 18 cents per 
hundred dollars which is located in the range set up by the Risk-Based Assessment 
System.14 This result emphasizes the important insight that banking regulations such 
as capital requirement and risk premium are essential to reduce the level of risk banks
. The failing probability of a bank is relatively lower, 0.17% under full 
insurance and 0.18% under partial system, when proper baking regulation is in place. 
Welfare varies across different deposit insurance systems. As in Figure 2, 
when the failing probability is low, as low as 0.1%, full insurance dominates partial 
coverage and the economy without insurance. A fair amount of risk premium can 
successfully manage the bank risk-taking behavior. However, when the bank 
increases the amount of risky assets to the point where failing probability locates in 
the range 0.3% ~ 0.35%, there is indifferent among three insurance systems. To make 
market discipline more incentive compatible, the FDIC announces a low coverage. 
When failing prob
 
14 Depending on the Risk-Based Assessment System from the FDIC, the FDIC charges premium rate 
from 5 to 43 cents per hundred dollars. 
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Note: The green dotted line represents the economy with no deposit insurance; the blue 
dashed line shows the full insurance; the red solid line is the partial coverage system. Figure 
2(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) results for welfare, risky asset, risk premium, coverage, and 
withdrawals, respectively.  
 
 
Cross Country Difference  
The heterogeneity of the coverage may vary from a generous guarantee to a 
very stringent limit. Demirguc-Kunt and Kane (2002) found that relatively poor 
countries such as Central African Republic, Chad, and Peru set up generous coverage 
limits while relatively high-income countries, Austria, Belgium, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom, tend to provide less protection. Table 2 illustrates the difference of 
the optimal coverage limit across countries calculated in this model.  
The result of this numerical example is consistent with the empirical evidence 
that countries with deposit insurances differ significantly on how much protection 
12 
 
  
they provide. Comparing developing countries and emerging markets, generally 
speaking, personal wealth and income of developed countries is much higher. Panel 
(a) and (b) in Table 2 mimic the case of developed countries and represent the wealth 
inequality in the economy, and panel (c) shows the situation of developing countries. 
When the initial endowment is higher, panel (a), a country tends to provide a 
moderate coverage, $80,000. Therefore, depositors’ early withdrawals increase to 
23.39 from 8.23 in the benchmark listed in Table 1. In contrast, the authority provides 
insurance close to full protection in the economy with lower personal wealth and 
income. The optimal coverage is $99,000 in panel (c) which is very close to the 
endowment of the rich at $100,000. Since most of the depositors, no matter rich or 
poor, are under full deposit protection in the case of (c), it is not surprising that the 
optimal withdrawals drop to zero.  
In addition, Table 2 lists the optimal coverage ratio, coverage over per capita 
GDP, calculated from the numerical example. Empirically, Garcia (1999) surveys the 
ratio of deposit coverage to per capita GDP in 68 countries. The average ratio is 
around 6.2 in Africa and is followed by 4 in Asia, 3.4 in Middle East, 3.2 in Western 
Hemisphere, and the lowest being 1.6 in Europe. The coverage ratio in our study 
varies from 1.03 to 2.68. The optimal coverage ratio for a relatively wealthy country 
is 1.702 in panel (a) which is lower than the one in the emerging economy, 2.6727, in 
panel (c). Compared to Garcia’s survey, the numerical example demonstrates that 
both developing and developed countries tend to provide generous coverage. One 
possible explanation could be the society may not appropriately internalizing the 
externality resulted from the insurance policy. Too-big–to–fail is one of the examples 
that show market imperfection and externality.    
 
Table 2 Equilibrium Results of Cross-Country Difference  
 SW C  p ERD EW ERB Pf I C ratio 
(a) D1=$200,000 52430 $80,000 0.0015 48169 23.393 4261.0 0.0020 8730.5 1.7021 
(b) q=0.5 86437 $80,000 0.0014 79409 44.725 7028.7 0.0020 14446 1.0323 
(c) D1=$100,000 41269 $99,000 0.0018 37922 0 3348 0.0018 6747.4 2.6757 
Note: Panel (a) increases the endowment of the rich to 200,000 from 125,000 and panel (c), on the other hand, 
reduces the endowment of the rich to 100,000. Panel (b), assumes that 50 percent of depositors belong to the rich 
and the other half of depositors are the poor.   
 
Next, we examine the effect of monitoring cost in Table 3. When monitoring 
cost gradually decreases from $500 to $5, there is a welfare increase in the partially 
covered insurance. When monitor is costly, panel (a), monitoring bank’s risk taking 
behavior is not incentive compatible for depositors. Therefore, the best strategy the 
FDIC provides is a protection up to $124,000. When monitoring cost is cheaper, 
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depositors are much more willing to engage in monitoring so that the FDIC reduces 
the level of coverage since market discipline dominates. Interestingly, the higher cost 
reduces depositor’s incentives to monitor, but the protection from the coverage 
provides the compensation to depositors if bank fails. As a result, only a slight welfare 
difference of the partial coverage system can be observed when evaluate the variation 
of monitoring cost.  
 
Table 3 Equilibrium Result when Varying Monitoring Cost 
 SW C  p ERD EW ERB Pf I 
(a) d=500 44058 $124,000 0.0018 40483 0 3574.3 0.0018 7203.5
(b) d=5 44063 $80,000 0.0017 40486 8.2341 3577.1 0.0018 7255.9
Note: Panel (a) considers the case when monitoring cost is relatively costly and Panel (b) 
studies the case when monitoring is relatively low comparing to the benchmark, d=50. 
 
Finally, this paper addresses the effect of the past failing probability in Table 
4. Under the partially-covered insurance system, depositors update their information 
set and learn from the past experience. When *fP  is relatively low, the opportunity 
cost of monitoring is high. From the past information, the banking industry is healthy 
as the chance of a bank failure is low. Therefore, depositors will not engage in 
monitoring, and the optimal withdrawal is down to zero. When *fP  is high, 
depositors are relatively prudential and pay attention on banking management. Hence, 
the efficient banking regulation involves a lower level of coverage.  
 
Table 4 Equilibrium Result when Varying Past Failing Probability 
 SW C  p ERD EW ERB Pf  I 
(a) *fP = 0.003 44061 $124,000 0.0018 40486 0 3574.3 0.0018 7203.5
(b) *fP =0.05 44058 $80,000 0.0017 40482 8.2258 3576.6 0.0018 7255 
Note: We consider the cases with a lower past failing probability in Panel (a) and a higher failing 
probability in Panel (b). 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
Analyzing the coverage-determination process has practical importance in two major 
areas. The first is for the countries that have adopted a well-established deposit 
insurance system for a long period of time. The optimal coverage limit in this study 
provides the possibility to resolve the moral hazard in banking system and, further, 
prevents the risk-oriented bank run by reinforcing the market discipline. More 
importantly, for the countries that have the implicit deposit insurance, our model 
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provides a theoretical foundation to support the introduction of a proper system which 
protects the small depositors and also reduces economic instability.  
The design of a proper deposit insurance scheme is brought back to discussion 
when the economy has experienced the worst financial turbulence since the Great 
Depression. A bank failure could easily turn into a crisis when the financial 
institutions are overly exposed to credit risks and when the government is least 
equipped to deal with those risks. Therefore, revision of current banking regulations 
and the deposit insurance scheme are essential. This research focuses on the joint 
determination of optimal coverage limit and optimal risk premium within a partial 
equilibrium model in an effort to tackle the moral hazard problem. The model also 
incorporates banking regulation of capital requirements and market discipline from 
depositor’s monitoring in a partial equilibrium model, which includes risk-taking 
banks, ex-ante heterogeneous depositors, and an insurance company providing deposit 
insurance.  
We find optimal level of coverage encourages depositor’s monitoring and 
improves social welfare. When the partial coverage limit is in place, banks are better 
off by balancing between the deposit premia and the depositor’s monitoring and 
withdrawals. The adjustment between the level of coverage and the premium provide 
some flexibility on long term liquidity of the Deposit Insurance Funds in the FDIC. 
This issue becomes extremely important when financial crisis requires tremendous 
credit and liquidity support from the FDIC.   
This study provides an explanation of cross-county difference on how much 
protection their deposit insurance would provide. First, the numerical example shows 
that the economy with higher income provides moderate coverage. On the other hand, 
low income economy provides greater protection on insurance. Second, we shed light 
on income inequality. An economy with fairly high income inequality adopted a 
relatively generous coverage to protect small depositors and prevent panic and runs. 
Third, we find that when an economy is health for a long time with low probability of 
default, depositors pay less attention to monitoring banks. Thus, the best strategy of 
the FDIC is to provide a higher coverage to prevent banking instability. Last, using 
the coverage per capita GPD as an indicator, the ratios from the empirical evidence 
summarized by Garcia (1999) are higher than the ones we suggest in the study. This 
may reflect that countries may not appropriately internalize the externality generated 
from the insurance policy.  
There are some possible directions for further study. There are more than one 
angles to study the current crisis, but among all causes the systemic risk could easily 
spillover and could turn a banking failure into a financial crisis has blamed the most. 
Hence, the model will be more sophisticated if we consider not only the idiosyncratic 
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risk from either depositor's liquidity preference shock or from bank's inappropriate 
investment decision but also the aggregate uncertainty.  
This research determines the optimal coverage, but the timing and frequency 
to adjust the coverage limits are beyond the scope of the study. Time inconsistency of 
implementing a new coverage may impact efficiency and effectiveness of the policy. 
An ex ante efficient policy may not be efficient ex post if the delay of government 
response is big enough to generate panics in financial markets. Panics and unstable 
banking could exacerbate the financial situation and cause real economy problems. 
Frequency of adjusting the coverage limit may affect the credibility of the authority 
and may further affect people’s expectation. In current financial crisis, the FDIC 
increased the coverage limit temporarily to $250,000 from $100,000 on Oct, 2008. 
Then, later on the FDIC extended the deadline to Dec, 2013 on May, 2009. It could 
form an expectation of a permanent blanket guarantee of deposit insurance that 
increases the chance of future banking failures.  
Also, one way to foster market discipline and boost the monitoring and 
supervision from the side of depositors is to introduce co-insurance.15 Co-insurance 
would require depositors to share the pre-specified potential losses regardless of the 
size of their deposits. Required contractually at the beginning of the period, the 
coinsurance system seems to reinforce depositors’ market discipline. Determination of 
the optimal share for depositors and influence of the coinsurance against the potential 
moral hazard are worth further investigation.  
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15 According to Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2004), relatively fewer countries such as Chile, 
Colombia, Poland and the United Kingdom have adopted co-insurance system. 
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Appendix 1 Mapping procedure 
We solve the model by considering the interdependence among those three 
players and examining how they react to behavior of others. Given the parameters 
determined by the bank, I and Pf, and the policy parameters announced by the FDIC, 
p and C , we calculate the expected return for depositors, which is a function of Pf , 
C , and the set of exogenous variables. Given depositor’s reaction, ED and EW, we 
find the expected return of a bank, which is a function of EW, D*, C , and the set of 
exogenous variables. By doing so, we make sure the combination of EW and I will be 
the optimal choice for both depositors and bank. To find out how the optimal policy 
will locate, we run possible coverage limits from $80,000 to $250,000 dollars in a 
one-thousand interval and see which coverage will generate the highest total expected 
return16. Given the coverage with the highest total return, we claim the combination 
of EW, I and C  as the optimization in the model.  
The first loop control variable is the bank’s failing probability, Pf, from 1·10-3 
to 5·10-3 in a 1·10-5 interval. At each Pf , the second loop counter variable C is 
initialized at $80,000 at the start of the first pass through the loop and automatically 
increments by $1,000 each time through the loop to $250,000. Endogenous variables 
among three players listed in the front and followed by other exogenous variables in 
the model. 
 
1. Depositor’s maximization 
• Depositor’s decision depends on D*. If D1>D*, prob(monitor) =1, otherwise 
prob(monitor)=0  
• * *( , , , , )f FD f P C P d r=  
• * 1 2( , , , , )ED f D D D q d=  
• *1( , , , *, ( , , , , ))f FEW f P I C D exog D q d P r=   
• From the FDIC’s budget constraint, premium is  
*
1 2 1 2( , , , , , ) ( , , , , , , , )Fd P r  f fp f P C ED D D q f P C D D q= =
• * *1 2 1 2( , , , , , , , , ) ( , , ( , , , , , )*f F fER f P C D D D q d P r f P C exog D D q d= = )FD P r  
 
2. Bank’s maximization  
• Under the same loops, depositor’s monitoring is always between 0 and 1. 
Therefore, we have two possible results for ED given other exogenous 
variables. Also, we know Pf has one to one mapping for R
~ . 
• A bank is breakeven if the realization of the random gamble return R= R~ . When a 
bank’s payoff is less than its obligation, this bank is insolvent and fails. 
( ) .  fP prob R R= < 
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16 The difference between a full coverage and a partial coverage is through two defined thresholds. If 
the coverage is less than (D1-d), we report the result as partial coverage; otherwise, we report the result 
as full when the coverage is greater than r(D1-d). 
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• The two-step mapping from R~  to gamble assets I . First, given the first loop 
control variable Pf , we compute the inverse of the normal CDF from 
( )  fP prob R R= < 
• Second, from the bank’s maximizing function, we define 
(1/ )[ (1 ) ( )]R I k p k rα α ρ≡ − + − − + ED  
• Hence, 1 2( *, , ( , , , , , , , ))I f D C exog D D q d k rα ρ=  
• 2 *1 2( *, , , , ( , , , , , , , , , , ))FER f D EW C I exog D D q d R P k rσ α ρ=  
 
3. The FDIC’s maximization 
• Under the same loop iteration, we sum the expected return from depositor and 
from the bank. 
• At the point maximizing the sum of expected returns determines the optimal 
coverage of the FDIC, so as DER, ED, EW for depositor, ER, I, Pf for a bank, 
and p for the FDIC. 
 
 
 
